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Abstract. Few seem to have difﬁculty in distinguishing between religious and secu-
lar institutions, yet there is widespread disagreement regarding what “religion” actu-
ally means. Indeed, some go so far as to question whether there is anything at
all distinctive about religions. Hence, formulating a deﬁnition of “religion” that can
command wide assent has proven to be an extremely difﬁcult task. In this arti-
cle, I consider the most prominent of the many rival deﬁnitions that have been
proposed, the majority falling within three basic types: intellectual, affective and
functional deﬁnitions. I conclude that there are pragmatic reasons for favouring
the formerly popular view that essentialist deﬁnitions of “religions” are inadequate,
and that religions should be construed, instead, as possessing a number of “family
resemblances.” In so arguing, I provide a response to the view that there is nothing
distinctive about religions, as well as to the recent claim that religions do not exist.
Our world contains a striking diversity of religious traditions. Given
that most of us probably have no trouble recognizing such tradi-
tions as religious, it is perhaps surprising that there is little agreement
about what religion is or, indeed, if “it” is anything distinctive at all.
Scholars have sought to deﬁne religion so as to identify both what
makes something a religion and what, if anything, distinguishes reli-
gions from secular social organizations like clubs. Elementary though
this task may seem, it has proven difﬁcult to formulate a deﬁnition of
religion that can command wide assent. Many rival deﬁnitions have
been proposed, most of which can be classiﬁed as examples of one
of three basic types:1 intellectual deﬁnitions, affective deﬁnitions, and
functional deﬁnitions.
Rival deﬁnitions of religion
Intellectual deﬁnitions stipulate that the deﬁning, or essential, feature
of religion is belief about a particular sort of object. The following deﬁ-
nition, suggested by James Martineau, is of this type: “Religion is the
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belief in an ever living God.”2 While deﬁnitions of this type highlight
something important about religions – the undeniable fact that proposi-
tional beliefs typically play a signiﬁcant role within them – nevertheless,
they take no account of other, equally prominent, features of religion.
They fail to recognize, for example, the centrality of “religious” emo-
tions like piety, the importance of faith, and the key role of traditional
practices. Yet each would seem to constitute typical features of many
religions. A further problem is that deﬁning religion in terms of belief
that has a particular kind of object, such as God, entails that certain
belief systems which are routinely regarded as religions – Theravada
Buddhism, for example – would have to be classed as non-religious; an
entailment which strikes many as counter-intuitive. To avoid this prob-
lem, one might suggest that any kind of belief would sufﬁce, as long
as it was held with sufﬁcient seriousness and intensity. However, build-
ing into intellectual deﬁnitions conditions about the way a belief is held
is tantamount to admitting that intellectual deﬁnitions by themselves
are inadequate. It would also allow any kind of belief system to be a
candidate for the label “religious,” provided only that it was held with
sufﬁcient passion.
Moreover, we do not need to look to non-monotheistic religions to
see the inadequacy of intellectual deﬁnitions. For they would not even
seem to be applicable to Judaism. As Eugene Borowitz claims: “for the
Jew, religion cannot be so easily identiﬁed with the afﬁrmation of a
given content of belief.”3 As Borowitz further points out, such deﬁni-
tions would seem to be particularly suited to Protestant forms of Chris-
tianity, which do tend to portray religion as essentially the afﬁrmation
of a set of beliefs. Indeed, those who propose intellectual deﬁnitions
would seem to regard Protestant Christianity as the paradigmatic form
of religion, and such a standpoint is clearly inadequate today in an
increasingly multi-cultural world. Let us therefore consider another type
of deﬁnition, and see if it is any less problematic.
Affective deﬁnitions of religion regard faith, and the emotions
that characteristically accompany it, as the deﬁning, or essential, fea-
tures of religion. George Lindbeck refers to this type of deﬁnition as
“experiential-expressive” because deﬁnitions of this type focus on “the
‘experiental-expressive’ dimension of religion,” and interpret “doctrines
as non-informative and non-discursive symbols of inner feelings, atti-
tudes, or existential orientations.”4 As Lindbeck observes, despite their
considerable dissimilarities, intellectual and affective deﬁnitions are akin
insofar as they are both religious types of deﬁnition. In other words,
they describe religion from a perspective that focuses on features of
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religion that are important to believers. Thus, these two approaches, or
combinations of them, are typically adopted by theologians and other
religiously-committed scholars.5
The most well-known affective deﬁnition was proposed by a foun-
dational ﬁgure within modern Protestant theology, Friedrich Schle-
iermacher (1768–1834). Schleiermacher stipulated that the “essence of
religion consists in the feeling of absolute dependence.”6 While exactly
what Schleiermacher meant by “feeling” in this context is, of course,
subject to a variety of interpretations, this deﬁnition is clearly a prod-
uct of his conception of religion as, primarily, a way of experiencing
reality rather than a set of doctrinal formulations. Useful though his
deﬁnition may be, it is clearly a reaction against intellectual deﬁni-
tions. As such, it is, perhaps, too one-sided to serve as an objective
deﬁnition. By deﬁning religion purely in terms of a certain kind of
feeling – the feeling of absolute dependence – Schleiermacher would
seem to underestimate the important role played within many reli-
gions by religious teachings, doctrines and creeds. While Schleierm-
acher did not deny that religions typically incorporated such features
as teachings, doctrines and creeds, in undervaluing the importance of
such intellectual components of religions, he presents, what many have
regarded as, a distorted picture of religion. Moreover, his deﬁnition
appears to be biased towards his own religious tradition. It may well
be that the kind of feeling he focuses upon is the deﬁning feature of
Lutheran Christianity (or, at least, was so during his lifetime). How-
ever, such a feeling would not appear to be central to, for example,
most forms of Buddhism7 or, to take another example, to Daoism. If
that is the case, then the feeling of absolute dependence cannot be the
deﬁning feature of all religions.
Another criticism that might be leveled against Schleiermacher’s deﬁ-
nition is that the feeling of absolute dependence may be experienced by
both religious people and self-avowedly non-religious people – which,
again, suggests that such a feeling does not constitute a deﬁning fea-
ture of religion. For example, environmentalists can have a feeling of
absolute dependence upon the natural world without thereby hold-
ing a religious attitude (although some do hold one). Schleiermacher
himself, however, saw this as an advantage of his theory. He believed
that people mistakenly perceived themselves as non-religious because
they rejected formalized religious doctrines and ofﬁcial religious insti-
tutions; but rejecting these and rejecting religion were in his opinion two
quite distinct activities.8 Thus, Schleiermacher is quite happy to insist
that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for being religious is that one
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experience the feeling of absolute dependence. It was precisely this kind
of view that the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, criticized
in his inﬂuential work The Future of an Illusion. Freud claimed that it
was a mistake to describe “as ‘deeply religious’ anyone who admits to a
sense of man’s insigniﬁcance or impotence in the face of the universe.”9
Rather, only those who seek a remedy for this feeling are genuinely reli-
gious. In his view: “The man who goes no further, but humbly acquies-
ces in the small part which human beings play in the great world – such
a man is, on the contrary, irreligious in the truest sense of the word.”10
Indeed, in Freud’s account, religion is a remedy for the kind of feeling
referred to by Schleiermacher. On this view, religious practices such as
ceremonies and rituals, if successful, function to remedy the disturbing
sensation of “man’s insigniﬁcance or impotence in the face of the uni-
verse.” Hence, Schleiermacher might be accused of confusing the cause
of religion with the meaning of “religion.”11
This brings us to the third type of deﬁnition of religion: func-
tional deﬁnitions. These concentrate on the function of religion as its
deﬁning, or essential, feature. The particular function that religion is
thought to serve is not always, however, the one that Freud identi-
ﬁed. Rather, the purported function of religion is sometimes construed
more broadly. Consider, for example, the anthropologist J. G. Frazer’s
deﬁnition: “By religion, then, I understand a propitiation or concili-
ation of powers superior to man. . ..”12 Frazer, then, deﬁnes religion
in terms of its supposedly propitiatory or conciliatory function. But
do all religions serve such a function? It would seem not. For yet
again, Buddhism constitutes a clear counter-example. It is even ques-
tionable whether the various monotheisms should be seen as fulﬁll-
ing this function. Moreover, it seems implausible to hold that religions
as diverse as Lutheran Christianity, Advaita Vedanta Hinduism and
Daoism all serve the same function – however, broadly this function
is conceived.
This brief survey might suggest that what each type of deﬁni-
tion regards as the deﬁning, or essential, feature of religion should
be incorporated into a comprehensive deﬁnition: one that would give
due weight to the intellectual, the affective and the functional com-
ponents of religion. Unfortunately, such a comprehensive deﬁnition
would be problematic because, like the various types of deﬁnition
examined above, it would either encompass too much or too little.
For example, there would be nothing to exclude secular humanism or
Marxism from counting as religions. Moreover, one could not respond
to the problem of including too much by building the notion of a
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religious ultimate, or God, into the deﬁnition. That strategy would
certainly exclude secular humanism and Marxism, but it would also
exclude “religions” like Theravada Buddhism and Daoism (in which
the notion of God does not play a signiﬁcant role). Clearly, any deﬁ-
nition of religion that failed to include these principal forms of reli-
gion would be severely inadequate.
In addition, not only does each type of deﬁnition considered above
fail to apply to mainstream forms of eastern religious traditions, but
each also seems inapplicable to Judaism. Some argue that a deﬁni-
tion of religion inclusive of Judaism would have to acknowledge that
being Jewish involves a relationship to the Jewish community.13 Yet
no prominent intellectual, affective or functional deﬁnition emphasizes
the religious person as part of a community. But surely, this consid-
eration would apply to Christianity and Islam, too. Most, if not all,
forms of Christianity conceive individual Christians to be intrinsically
part of the ecclesial community. Likewise, Muslims do not stand alone
but are part of the umma – the Muslim community. The importance
of this dimension of religiosity is apparent if one considers what takes
place when a person converts to one of the Abrahamic religions: they
are welcomed into the community of the Jewish People, the Church,
or the umma. Because the types of deﬁnition surveyed above fail to
acknowledge this important dimension of Abrahamic monotheisms,
many ﬁnd them inadequate.
Clearly, though, any assessment of the adequacy of a deﬁnition of
religion is likely to be inﬂuenced by the kind of theory of religion
one presupposes. Deﬁnitions are, it might be claimed, miniature ver-
sions of the theories which inspire them. And there is an important
difference between religious theories of religion and naturalistic ones.14
Typically, theories of the former type are developed by thinkers belong-
ing to some particular religious tradition. They usually presuppose a
religious interpretation of ourselves and our world, and they attempt to
justify that interpretation by providing an account of the divine origin
of the religion in question. A religious theory might, for example, appeal
to the role of prophets or angels as divine messengers instrumental in
the formation of a particular historical religious tradition. Or, more
generally, religion may be conceived as a response to revelation in the
form of divine word or deed. James Thrower claims that religious the-
ories can be identiﬁed by the way they regard religion as ontologically
primary; that is, by viewing religion as capable of explaining other phe-
nomena and in no need of explanation itself.15 Naturalistic theories, on
the other hand, regard the phenomena of religion to be in need of some
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explanation. In contrast to religious theories, they attempt to explain
religion by appealing to natural facts. Freud’s theory of religion, for
example, is a naturalistic theory that tries to explain religion by appeal
to facts about human psychology.16 Inﬂuential forms of naturalistic the-
ory have been proposed by Karl Marx, E´mile Durkheim, Max Weber
and, more recently, the sociobiologist E. O. Wilson. Such theories were
especially prominent in the second half of the 19th century and in the
ﬁrst half of the 20th. Their popularity seems to rise and wane in accor-
dance with the success or failure of the more general psychological,
political, economic, social or biological theory within which they are
embedded.
In line with this distinction between religious and naturalistic theo-
ries of religion, deﬁnitions of religion can be categorized as either reli-
gious or naturalistic.17 Clearly, a non-sectarian scholar will be likely to
ﬁnd many of the available religious deﬁnitions of religion unaccept-
able. This is because many of them presuppose the truth of certain key
religious claims – such as, for example, that there “are manifestations
of a Power which transcends our knowledge.”18 Nevertheless, many
scholars remain cautious of naturalistic deﬁnitions of religion. This is
because, as we have seen, they are derived from naturalistic theories
of religion, which are themselves part of highly controversial theories
of much broader scope. While naturalistic theories remain inﬂuential,
they have not been widely accepted because they rely on assumptions
about religion which are highly contested – and, for the same reason,
naturalistic deﬁnitions also fail to achieve widespread support.
Given the difﬁculties of both religious and naturalistic theories of
religion, some scholars have attempted to stipulate a deﬁnition that
presupposes neither a religious nor a naturalistic theory. Keith Yandell
argues that the following deﬁnition is neutral between religious and
naturalistic theories: “a religion is a conceptual system that provides
an interpretation of the world and the place of human beings in it,
bases an account of how life should be lived given that interpreta-
tion, and expresses this interpretation and lifestyle in a set of rituals,
institutions and practices.”19 While Yandell may well have succeeded
in maintaining a neutral stance between religious and naturalistic deﬁ-
nitions of religion, his deﬁnition nevertheless exhibits the now familiar
problem of including too much. Maoism, for example, is “a concep-
tual system that provides an interpretation of the world and the place
of human beings in it” and which “bases an account of how life
should be lived given that interpretation” and, moreover, “expresses
this interpretation and lifestyle in a set of rituals, institutions and
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practices.” Yet most people would want to say that Maoism is most
accurately classiﬁed as a political ideology and not as a religion.
The failure of a deﬁnition such as Yandell’s to demarcate the reli-
gious from the non-religious domain, without taking a stance on the
religious versus naturalistic issue, might suggest that we should con-
sider religion from another perspective. It may be that religions fall
under the wider concept “culture.” Indeed, this has been suggested by
the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who argues that religions should
be analyzed as cultural systems.20 Geertz took the concept “culture”
to denote “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied
in symbols, a system of inherited conception expressed in symbolic
forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop
their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”21 Clearly, both reli-
gious and secular “patterns of meaning” would ﬁt under this deﬁ-
nition of culture. Nevertheless, Geertz offers a deﬁnition of religion
that aspires to identify religions as a sub-class of cultures. According
to Geertz, “a religion is: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2)
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations
in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of exis-
tence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factu-
ality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”22
There is no doubt that this deﬁnition of religion has provided schol-
ars with a useful perspective from which to study religions.23 Never-
theless, it is not unproblematic. First, adherents of Marx’s historical
materialism, especially when they wave red ﬂags, may well be counted
as religious on this deﬁnition. And second, religions in which symbols
appear to play a relatively minor role – Quakerism, for example – do
not seem to register on Geertz’s theory. Indeed, religions would seem
to be more diverse and complex than his theory allows. While telling
us part of the story, he inevitably leaves much untold. Indeed, every
theory presupposes some account of what data will be relevant and
what must be explained. With a limited deﬁnition of “religion,” theo-
rists, in focusing on this data, will inevitably draw attention away from
other aspects of religion – aspects that another brand of theorist may
regard as of key importance. Each theory we have considered, then,
comes with its own peculiar biases. Perhaps for this reason, theories of
religion would seem to rival religions in the diversity they exhibit, and
the prevailing deﬁnitions of religion they have generated seem to have
shed little light on what – if anything – all and only religions have in
common.
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An alternative approach
Given the difﬁculty of arriving at a satisfactory deﬁnition, the suspi-
cion arose that the attempt to deﬁne “religion” is futile. In the early
1960s, Wilfred Cantwell Smith argued that the attempt was misguided,
and could not succeed, because the term “religion” does not pick out
phenomena that are naturally grouped together. In other words, reli-
gions do not possess some common deﬁning feature that the term
“religion” picks out. According to Smith, “religion” is a concept cre-
ated by modern western scholars and superimposed upon a variety of
phenomena; the superimposition serving to create the impression that
“religion” is a uniﬁed thing. This superimposition gradually began to
take place, Smith believes, in the 18th century. At that time there was
a sudden swell of interest in other cultures on the part of western
scholars. Prior to the introduction of the concept “religion,” Smith
argues, there were simply a variety of interconnected practices and
beliefs embedded in the various cultures of the world. Moreover, these
beliefs and practices could not be neatly parceled into either of the
two, mutually exclusive, categories of “religious” and “secular.” Smith
further claims that there was no need for the term “religion” until
the various cultures of the world began to have prolonged encoun-
ters with one another, particularly during the colonial period.24 One
result of the superimposition of the new concept was, Smith opines,
that people increasingly viewed themselves as members of ideologically
opposed communities. Moreover, in many cases, they came to regard
themselves as in exclusive possession of both truth and the promise of
salvation.
In Smith’s view, then, “religion” is a divisive concept that stimu-
lates ideological confrontation. Thus, he counsels that the concept be
abandoned, pointing out that people
throughout history and throughout the world have been able to be
religious without the assistance of a special term, without the intel-
lectual analysis that the term implies. In fact, I have come to feel
that, in some ways, it is probably easier to be religious without the
concept; that the notion of religion can become an enemy to piety.
One might almost say that the concern of the religious man is with
God; the concern of the observer is with religion.. . . In any case,
it is not altogether foolish to suggest that the rise of the concept
“religion” is in some ways correlated with a decline in the practice
of religion itself.25
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Persuasive as this position has seemed to many, it is nevertheless
deeply problematic. The theory does not, for example, enable us to
understand how the wars of religion, which ravaged Western Europe
in the transition from the medieval to the modern period, were reli-
gious wars. Nor does it seem able to account for the persecution of
Jewish people that was a persistent feature of European history long
before the modern era. Moreover, there is evidence that a major force
in the extremely lengthy development of certain religious traditions
has been their awareness of rival traditions.26 It may be that Smith’s
theory provides a more accurate characterization of the indigenous
belief systems of India and Africa, many of which to this day remain-
ing localized and lacking a trans-geographical organizing body, than it
does of the religions of Europe – particularly as they developed in the
Common Era.
It may be, though, that such criticisms miss the main point of
Smith’s argument. In the passage quoted above, Smith characterizes
the concept “religion” as the enemy of religion. He thus appears to
accept that there is such a thing as religion. Perhaps we should, there-
fore, interpret him as denying that the concept “religion” appropri-
ately latches onto that thing. But if Smith’s concerns are solely about
the limitations of our present conception of “religion,” then surely
they can be allayed by reﬁning the concept. And the attempt to reﬁne
our concept better to reﬂect what religions actually are is surely what
motivates scholars to seek deﬁnitions of religion.
Despite these problems, many scholars agree with Smith that the
search for a deﬁning feature of religion is futile. Moreover, there is
widespread recognition that the problems encountered in attempting
to deﬁne religion might not originate from anything unusual about
the phenomenon of religion, but rather from the assumption that con-
cepts represent things that are grouped together by virtue of having a
common deﬁning feature, or essence. Perhaps the various religions do
not have any deﬁning features, or essence, in common? The argument
that, contrary to surface appearances, certain concepts do not have a
single, essential, deﬁning feature was, of course, advanced by Ludwig
Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein illustrates his theory of language by means of the
word “game,” claiming that it is fruitless to search for a single feature
that all games have in common.27 Prior to reﬂection, most of us prob-
ably assume that if things are games, then there must be some fea-
ture they all possess that makes them all games. But as Wittgenstein
asks:
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What is common to them all? – Don’t say: “There must be some-
thing in common, or they would not be called ‘games’ ” – but look
and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look
at them you will not see something that is common to all, but sim-
ilarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.28
Wittgenstein shows that if we consider any feature that some games
possess, we will ﬁnd some other game that does not possess it. Com-
petitive activity, for example, may at ﬁrst sight appear to be a feature
possessed by all games. However, counter-examples are easy to come
by: certain card games, solitaire for instance, are not competitive. As
no feature is possessed by all games, no single feature can be used to
deﬁne what games are.
Wittgenstein’s analysis of the word “game” is meant to show that
concepts are not necessarily as simple as they might at ﬁrst appear.
A single concept, like “game,” can be used to refer to things that do
not share any deﬁning feature. He claims that we are misled by such
concepts if we assume that there must be some feature possessed by
everything falling under one of them. In Wittgenstein’s view, many of
our concepts are like this. Later thinkers, inspired by his approach,
have proposed that one reason why religion is so difﬁcult to deﬁne
might be because “religion” is one of these concepts that do not refer
to things possessing a single deﬁning characteristic. Perhaps, instead,
“religion” is a complex concept used to refer to things sharing a num-
ber of features – and thereby exhibiting a number of “family resem-
blances” – not all of which need be present.
Consider Theravada Buddhism and Christianity: both revere a holy
founder, but Theravada Buddhists, unlike Christians, do not believe in
a God. So these religions exhibit a family resemblance as well as an
important difference. Contrast these religions with Shaivite Hinduism,
whose adherents do not revere a holy founder but who do believe in
a God. Were we to compare and contrast all religions, we may well
ﬁnd nothing that they all have in common, but we might neverthe-
less discover many overlapping resemblances between them. In fact,
increased knowledge of world religions seems to many to support this
assessment. The study of religions discloses an enormous diversity of
beliefs and practices interwoven with striking resemblances. The diver-
sities can be so extreme that even two forms of the “same” tradition
might seem to have little important in common (never mind one com-
mon deﬁning feature). Nevertheless, both can be recognized as bearing
a family resemblance to one another.29 Such observations, combined
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with the many difﬁculties involved in the search for a deﬁnition of
religion which is neither too inclusive nor too exclusive, have led many
to adopt a “family resemblance approach” to religion;30 John Hick
being one prominent advocate of this approach.31 Hick advises us to
abandon the search for a deﬁnition of religion and instead recognize
that religions have family resemblances that allow us to identify them
as falling under the concept “religion.”
This approach, however, is not unproblematic. If we regard as a
member of the “religious family” everything that has some feature in
common with standard examples of religion, the concept “religion” will
have such a wide scope that it may well be analytically useless.32 More-
over, there would seem to be a host of resemblances between “religious”
and “secular” belief systems.33 Given so many resemblances, how could
we determine which of them allow us to identify something as a mem-
ber of the religious family? To decide which resemblances are relevant
and which are not would seem to require additional criteria. Hick, in
recognizing this need, suggests that, because religious beliefs and prac-
tices characteristically have a deep importance for those who hold them,
Paul Tillich’s notion of “ultimate concern” might stand as our central
criterion. In other words, beliefs and practices are to be recognized as
part of the “religious family” by virtue of being invested with “ulti-
mate concern.” Hick claims that this “quality of importance pervades
the ﬁeld of religious phenomena. Not everything that has more than
transient importance to us is religious; but all authentic as opposed
to merely nominal religiousness seems to involve a sense of profound
importance.”34 Notice that this is not offered as a deﬁnition of religion
but as a criterion by which we can rule out certain things as excluded
from the family of religions. It seems, then, that without the help of an
additional criterion, the family resemblance approach is a blunt ana-
lytical tool that cannot distinguish between cases of religion and cases
of non-religion. However, a new problem is raised by the attempt to
provide a supplementary criterion. Any criterion will reﬂect its propo-
nent’s assumptions about the nature of religion; this is clearly true, for
example, of Hick’s criterion. But the family resemblance approach was
offered in order to avoid such assumptions.
At this point it appears that we have come full circle. What one
is prepared to regard as a religiously-relevant family resemblance will
depend upon what one means by “religion.” Given certain assump-
tions, one might include belief systems such as humanism and Marx-
ism; given certain others, one might not. One way out of this impasse
might be to resist the urge to supplement the family resemblance
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approach with a separate criterion, and to accept that in some cases
there will be no clear answer to the question of whether something is
part of the family of religions or not. Hick concedes this much even
while advocating his additional criterion. For he claims that in some
cases – Confucianism and Christian Science, for example – there may
not be a clear answer. In such cases, he opines, one can merely note
“their positions within a complex, ramiﬁed network of related phe-
nomena” and “[h]aving done this we have resolved – or perhaps dis-
solved – the problem of the deﬁnition of ‘religion.”’35
Some have held, however, that the fact of there being no clear
answer to the question whether or not something is a religion or reli-
gious is symptomatic of a deeper problem afﬂicting the concept “reli-
gion” and its cognates. Timothy Fitzgerald argues that the fact that
“religion” has no clear meaning implies that there is no such thing
as religion.36 According to Fitzgerald, people have failed to deﬁne
religion because there are no genuine religious phenomena to iden-
tify. Purported religious phenomena are, he argues, the result of our
imposing an artiﬁcial conceptual division between the “religious” and
the “secular” onto a world that does not exhibit any such distinc-
tion. It is to this conclusion that the existence of the borderline cases
discussed above points, in his view. Consequently, Fitzgerald proposes
that “[r]eligion cannot reasonably be taken to be a valid analyti-
cal category. . ..”37 And he concludes that, because it has no legiti-
mate object, religious studies should be assimilated to cultural studies,
and scholars of religion, as a distinct species of academic, should be
retired. Thus, he claims, the concept “religion” and its cognates should
be withdrawn from circulation.
Is it the case, however, that terms with no clear meaning are
not analytically useful and should be eliminated from our discourse?
Inspection will reveal that many of our terms lack a clear meaning.
Perhaps, then, “religion” is “open textured” or an example of a vague
concept. A vague concept typically has a range of applications that
are undisputed alongside other possible applications in which there
is no clear answer to the question of whether or not the concept is
appropriately applied. While such concepts are philosophically inter-
esting, they are by no means rare. Natural languages contain a large
number of vague concepts, many of which being mundane. “Bald,”
for example, is a vague concept. How much hair must you have lost
in order for the concept “bald” to apply appropriately to you? Many
cases of hair-loss seem to be borderline cases in which it is neither
deﬁnitely right nor deﬁnitely wrong to call a person bald. This is not
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usually taken to imply that there is something mysterious about bald-
ness, or that we should drop the concept “bald.” Nor does it raise
doubts about whether there is such a thing as baldness. If we can
accept that some of our concepts are like this, and that their vague-
ness does not make them unduly problematic, then why not regard
“religion” as such a concept? Other examples of terms that lack a
clear meaning, but which are analytically important nevertheless, are
“species” and “mind.” These have no clear or undisputed meaning,
yet they are both central to their respective disciplines of biology and
psychology. That such terms have no clear meaning generates ques-
tions which fuel research within these disciplines. It is not usually
taken to suggest either that the terms be dropped or that the disci-
plines be assimilated into others that do not employ them. It seems
open to us to view “religion” in the same way. That it has no clear
undisputed meaning may be what contributes to its ability to stimu-
late research programs. Such a lack of clear meaning would not, then,
seem to constitute a good reason for phasing-out the term; just as dis-
pute about the meaning of “species” or “mind” is not usually taken as
sufﬁcient grounds for dropping both the terms and the areas of study
in which they are central. Fitzgerald’s conclusion, then, does not seem
to be entailed by his premises.
There is a further, more practical, reason, though, why we should
resist the idea that religion does not constitute a distinct phenomenon.
Consider again the question: why should we try to deﬁne religion? As
we have seen, whether or not Marxism is a religion is one example
of the type of question that has given rise to the search for a deﬁni-
tion of religion. An appropriate deﬁnition of religion would enable us
to determine what we can legitimately count as being covered by the
term “religion.” And this matters because there are a number of well-
documented cases in which great signiﬁcance is attached to the ques-
tion of whether some particular belief system should be classiﬁed as
a religion or not. It has not been uncommon, for example, for gov-
ernments to call upon their citizens to ﬁght in wars. But the govern-
ments of many countries exempted those citizens whose conscientious
objection to participation in war was based on a religious belief – say,
one that committed them to paciﬁsm. Clearly, whether or not one’s
beliefs were counted as “religious” was of great importance in these
circumstances. To take a concrete example, during the World War II,
the government of the United States called upon its citizens to ﬁght.
Many claimed exemption on the grounds of religious beliefs that com-
mitted them to paciﬁsm. However, certain of the “religions” adhered
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to by would be conscientious objectors were not recognized by the US
government as religions. As a result, many found themselves denied
the status of conscientious objectors, and were incarcerated for refus-
ing to ﬁght. Quakers as well as Hopis were denied conscientious-
objector status, and were imprisoned because their respective belief
systems were not ofﬁcially recognized as religions.38 In short, these
paciﬁsts were imprisoned simply because the deﬁnition of religion
adopted by the government of the United States excluded their “reli-
gion” from ofﬁcial recognition.
Such religious discrimination runs counter to the trend, dominant
throughout much of the 20th century, to accord greater value to reli-
gious freedom. Indeed, freedom of religion is identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant
human right in a landmark document of the last century, the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that
[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change their religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or in private, to manifest their religion or belief in teach-
ing, practice, worship and observance.39
Deﬁnitions of religion that are too limited in scope can be a serious
impediment to the success of efforts to claim, or to protect, this right.
So the debate about the best way to deﬁne “religion,” which at ﬁrst
sight may have appeared purely academic, turns out to have wide ram-
iﬁcations with respect to vitally important human concerns. For this
reason, we should be cautious of Fitzgerald’s claim that there is no
such thing as religion; a hard-won right to religious freedom will not
elicit much respect if the existence of religion is seriously questioned.
This notwithstanding, if we consider what originally motivated the
search for a deﬁnition of religion, we may ﬁnd that there is some truth
to Fitzgerald’s claim. The search for a deﬁnition of religion can be
seen as quintessentially modern insofar as modernity was the ﬁrst era
in which a ﬁrm distinction between religion and the rest of human
activity was presupposed. As previous eras made no such distinction,
they had no need of the concepts “religious” and “secular.” Such con-
cepts can be seen as a product of the modern impulse to separate
“religion” from the rest of cultural life,40 in order to underwrite the
independent autonomy of the “secular” realm of the social and polit-
ical world. As Joseph D. Bettis comments:
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The attempt to describe religion as a separate and independent
sphere of human activity did not appear until the nineteenth cen-
tury. Schleiermacher’s On Religion was one of the ﬁrst books to
regard it as an isolable subject. Prior to that a religious tradition
was identiﬁed with the cultural tradition that provided the funda-
mental means of individual and social identiﬁcation. Traditionally,
religion referred to the basic guiding images and principles of an
individual and a culture. Religion was identical with style of life.41
Given the provenance of the peculiarly modern attempt to distin-
guish “religion” from other areas of human activity, it is not surpris-
ing that religion should elude concise deﬁnition and, hence, appear to
some as a ﬁctional entity created by modern intellectuals. In a sense,
then, we might argue that “religion” is a ﬁctional entity: it seems not
to be a ready-made feature of the world but rather a construction gen-
erated by a powerful desire to impose ﬁrm conceptual distinctions on
a world that, perhaps, does not, in itself, exhibit them. However, in
another sense, religion does not seem merely to be a ﬁctional entity,
for the result of projecting “religion” onto the world may well be that
our world has come genuinely to exhibit it. Like a self-fulﬁlling proph-
ecy, the desire to separate a “religious” from a “secular” realm may
have led to the emergence of two distinct realms – a sphere of iden-
tiﬁable religious practices and institutions, on the one hand, and a
sphere of secular practices and institutions that explicitly exclude the
religious, on the other.42 To complicate matters further, though, the
creation of distinct “religious” and “secular” realms would not appear
to have taken place at the same speed throughout all parts of the
world.
It may seem that these problems are unlikely to affect our under-
standing of the major religious traditions. However, issues often arise
regarding what counts as Judaism, Christianity or Islam.43 So, it may
well be that these ancient and established religious traditions can
best be seen as constituted by sub-traditions united by family resem-
blances – resemblances, moreover, that often appear to be obscured
from the view of religious practitioners themselves. Religious tradi-
tionalists tend to opt for an essentialist view of their religious tradi-
tion, arguing that those who have let go of some particular beliefs
or practices should not be considered genuine adherents of the faith.
Analyzing religious traditions and sub-traditions in terms of family
resemblances might have the advantage of granting us a perspective
from which to examine a religion without having to accept uncritically
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the interpretation of that religion advanced by any one group within
its family. It may also facilitate awareness of both the similarities
between the different sub-traditions of one religion and the impor-
tant differences between them. Moreover, this approach might also
be fruitfully applied to portray the relationship between the three
Abrahamic faiths. For Judaism, Christianity and Islam may be seen as
diverging traditions within the extended family of Abrahamic mono-
theism. This approach thus provides a vantage point from which
to study the three faiths simultaneously, without being compelled to
make evaluative judgments concerning which is the “best” or the more
authentic form of monotheism. And the same could be said of the
non-Abrahamic faiths.
Conclusion
I have indicated some of the problems involved in deﬁning “religion.”
We have seen that the term “religion” is both highly contentious and
could be viewed as “essentially contested.”44 The debates generated
by this term suggest that an essentialist understanding of either reli-
gion or religious people should be avoided. An essentialist claims that
there are certain essential features that make a thing what it is, and
these features allow us to deﬁne it as such. According to an essential-
ist about religion, religion is one thing, and all religions are instances
of that thing in virtue of possessing the same essential property or
properties. What should we conclude from the implausibility of essen-
tialism about religion? Surely not that there is no such thing as reli-
gion. Rather, we should embrace the more limited conclusion that it
would be mistaken to assume that all religions exhibit the same essen-
tial features.
This conclusion has certain pragmatic advantages, which could,
themselves, be regarded as justifying such an approach to the concept
“religion.” For it encourages us to take seriously the real differences
that exist between religious traditions. Moreover, just as “religion”
would not seem to be one thing, there is no good reason to sup-
pose that Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are
each one homogeneous entity. Each of these religious traditions can
itself be analyzed using the family resemblance approach. If these tra-
ditions are thought of as composed of sub-traditions possessing fam-
ily resemblances, there will be less of an inclination to search for a
homogeneous tradition that is, itself, highly contested. Nor will we be
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inclined to expect all those who adhere to any one of the major reli-
gions to accept exactly the same set of beliefs. This approach thus
allows us to be sensitive to the diversity of religious belief and prac-
tice commonly found even within the “same” tradition, while simulta-
neously providing a framework for appreciating such diversity as part
of richly textured and continuously evolving traditions. In a nutshell,
while debates in the philosophy of language are ongoing,45 there are
pragmatic grounds for deploying a family resemblance approach. For,
surely, in a multi-cultural world we need a theoretical approach to the
study of religions that is not from the outset prejudicial to any reli-
gion. And a family resemblance approach seems most suited to this
requirement.
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